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1. Introduction1
Like in most other countries o f  the European Community, German unemploy­
ment has steadily increased since the mid-seventies. In 1997 it peaked at an 
unprecedented level in the post World War II period: In the first month o f  that 
year over 3,2 million West Germans were officially registered as unemployed.
The vast literature on the European unemployment problem (Bean, C h.R . 
1994, Siebert, H., 1997, Nickell, S. 1997) offers no single explanation. It holds 
that a series o f adverse supply and demand shocks triggered layoffs propagated 
through different channels into the persistently high level o f  unemployment. 
M ost papers closely tie their explanation o f  persistence to the generous welfare 
state. One line o f  reasoning holds that labor market regulations increase hiring 
and firing costs. By that they enable employed workers to increase wages above 
market clearing levels (see, e.g., Berthold, N . and Fehn, R. 1996). Another 
argument states that the provision o f  unemployment compensation for an 
indefinite span o f  time provides incentives to increase search time and to lower 
search effort. In periods o f  rapid econom ic change, when the human capital o f  
dismissed workers quickly depreciates, this may raise the number o f  voluntarily 
unemployed people substantially (Ljungqvist, L. and Sargent, Th. 1995, 1996). 
Still another strand o f  the literature argues that international V ad e with less- 
developed countries exerts a downward pressure on the wages o f  unskilled workers. 
Inasmuch as trade unions successfully resist wage cuts, unemployment piles up 
(see, e.g., Krugman, R 1995, Burtless, G. 1995, and the books surveyed therein).
Except the search theoretic approach these arguments share a com m on theme: 
for the one or the other reason wages do not clear labor markets. Economists, 
thus, have devoted much effort to compare real wages with various estimates o f  
market clearing rates (see, e.g., Bruno, M. and Sachs, J. 1985 and Sachverstan- 
digenrat, 1994, p. 259 f.). Yet, I doubt, whether the concept o f  the so called wage 
gap, i.e., the spread between market clearing and actually observed wages, is 
empirically meaningful. The notion o f  market clearing wages is specific to the 
considered model. For instance, the real wage that clears the labor market in a
1 I am grateful to an anonym ous referee. The usual disclaimer applies.
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perfectly competitive environment causes unemployment if competition on product 
markets becomes imperfect. If markups vary over the business cycle or change in 
the long run, wages that increase according to labor productivity may not secure 
full employment. Since it is impossible to uncover the true economic model, the 
search for market clearing real wages is futile.
Instead, I will pursue another approach. Am ong business cycle researchers it 
has become com m on practice to employ small scale models that explain the stylized 
facts o f  econom ic fluctuations. I will therefore contrast the quantitative implica­
tions o f  wage gaps within two textbook models: a static model o f  North-South  
trade and a dynamic model o f  capital accumulation. My focus is on West German 
unemployment, since, evidently, the literature referenced above does not aim at 
a transitional economy. I choose rather simple models that require few parameters. 
There are two reasons for doing so. The first, clearly, is tractability. It is well 
known from the fixprice approach to macroeconomics (Benassy, J.-P. 1982, 1986 
provides an overview o f this line o f  research) that agents revise their plans on 
other markets if  they are rationed on the labor market. These spillover effects 
account for multiple types o f  equilibria in general settings. I want to avoid the 
ambiguities associated therewith and, thus, specify production and preferences in 
the simplest possible manner. The second reason is my believe that textbook  
models do not only serve as a means to illustrate the working o f economic 
mechanisms. Besides that their quantitative implications should be studied.
I use an extended version o f  the Krugman (1995) model calibrated to German 
data and show that the international trade argument explains only a small fraction 
o f unemployment. I will then draw attention to a much neglected aspect o f  the 
rigid wage argument. In a dynamic framework unemployment reduces capital 
accumulation. Future labor productivity and, thus, market clearing wages are 
lower than they otherwise would have been. Malinvaud (1982, 1983) explores the 
implications o f  both, fixed wages and interest rates, on employment within a 
putty-clay type growth model. His focus is on the interplay between demand and 
supply side determinants o f  investment expenditures. Long run unemployment 
may result from a lack o f  profitability as well as from insufficient demand. There 
are two reasons why I do not consider this framework as adequate. First, the 
wage gap hypothesis relates to sticky wages and not to fixed remuneration rates 
per se. Second, fixprice models with different regimes are difficult to calibrate. 
One must guess the econom ic regime in order to estimate the m odel’s parameters 
from observed data. Therefore, I resort to a much simpler, albeit empirically 
successful model (see Hamilton, J .D . and M onteagudo, J. (1998)): the Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (1992) extension o f  the Solow (1956) growth model. Within that 
framework even a small but a prolonged wage gap may explain considerable 
increases in unemployment.
I do not introduce the source o f  wage stickiness explicitly into this model. My 
argument is that major supply shocks, namely an increased work force and the 
capital shortage in the wake o f  German unification, required wage rates to 
temporarily drop below their long run growth path. Insiders resistance to wage
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cuts enhanced by the increasing tax wedge2 (including mandatory contributions 
to the various social security funds) prevented wages from doing so. The ceteris 
paribus lower rate o f  capital formation, then, widened the gap between actual 
and market clearing wage rates. At the same time, the increased share o f  long 
term unemployed workers reduced the pressure on wages.3
In the next section I asses the international trade argument. Section 3 considers 
the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) extension o f  the Solow  m odel under rigid 
real wages. Section 4 concludes, and an appendix covers technical details.
2. International trade and f ixed  relative wages
It is well known that trade between the human capital abundant, industrialized 
North and the labor abundant, developing South puts the wages o f  unskilled 
Northern workers under pressure. Krugman (1995) presents this argument in a 
simple two-factors-two-goods model. He calibrates this m odel to OECD econom ic 
data and calculates that the rigid wage structure explains a fall in employment o f  
over 1.4 percent.
I use an extended model. It admits capital as a factor o f  production and considers 
a third sector producing a non-tradeable good. It should be clear from the outset 
that a large service sector employing a considerable share o f  the unskilled work 
force lessens the impact o f  trade on employment. However, the conclusions remain 
untouched, if  capital is not explicitly introduced. So, consider the following model:
Sector i =  1 , 2 , 3  combines H i units o f  skilled labor, N t units o f unskilled labor, 
and Ki units o f  capital to produce Yi units o f  output according to a constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function:
(H I) Y, =  N ? H f ‘Kp ,  oci +  Pi +  yt =  1.
The representative firm in sector i is a price taker. I denote the price o f  good i 
as p ( and the prices o f  skilled labor, unskilled labor and capital as q, w and r, 
respectively. Profit maximization implies the following first order conditions:
(II-2) a M ' k V  =  v l Pl,
Pih?i~ i k r  =  q/Pi, 
yih p k j i- x = r j p (,
2 Between 1970 and 1985 the relation between the producers real wage and the consumers 
real wage increased from about 1.6 to 1.9 and varies since then around 1.8.
3 See Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Chapter 9 on this point.
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where h{ and k i denote inputs o f  human and physical capital per unskilled worker, 
respectively.
H ousehold j  e  [0,1] has the m oney income Bj  and maximizes a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function
(11.3) Uj =  Cl )C?j C % , c 1 +  c2 +  c3 =  \ ,  
subject to his budget constraint
(11.4) I  PiC ,j = BJ.
i =  1
Therefore, aggregate demand for good i is4
(11.5) Ci =  ci - , B : = ] B j dj.
P i  o
The total supply o f  factors is independent o f  prices and remuneration rates. 
In obvious notation, the respective magnitudes are N, H,  and K.
Equations (II.1) to (II.5), the market clearing conditions,
(11.6) y; = c,.,/ = 1,2,
H i N - N ,
I ,  Ht = H ,
L K i = K ,
and the accounting identity
(11.7) B = w ' £ N i +  q j ^ H i +  r j ^ K i = j ^ p i Yi,
i = i  ¡=i ;=i ¡=i
imply the following market clearing relative wage o f  the closed econom y:5
/"IT /  I I * « *  H(11.8) (w/q)* =  ^ —— -
L i P i c i N
Let us introduce bilateral trade as an exogenous shock to which relative wages 
( w j q )  do not respond whereas all other relative prices adjust. The shock origins
4 A  continuum  o f  mass one o f  identical consumers allows using aggregate and per-capital 
variables interchangeably.
5 The Appendix describes the derivation o f  this equation.
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from the “sudden” appearence o f  the South, and its size depends on the properties 
o f the offer curve o f  the South. I do not explicitly m odel the offer curve o f  the 
South. Instead, I control for the volume o f  trade, and thus, the shock size by 
postulating an import function:
(II.9) M  =  m (P1 1^ P 2^2 P3^j )  
P2
with the marginal propensity to import, m,  as a parameter o f  the model. Note, 
however, that this equation is not a behavioral equation o f  the household sector; 
it is an implicit assumption on the properties o f  the offer curve o f  the South: since 
capital is present, the fixed wage structure is not sufficient (as it is in Krugman’s
(1995) model) to pin down the terms o f  trade P2/Pi,  which are a function o f  both, 
the wage structur (w/q)  and the wage-rental ration (w/>). I prove in the Appendix 
that with w/q  fixed the terms o f  trade in the new equilibrium are related to m 
according to
(11.10) — =  ( —  
Pi \ P  i
'LiPiCj +  m jP i 
HiViCi +  fniYi ~ 7 2)_
where (P2/Pi)* is the autarkic price o f  the less skill intensive good in terms o f  
the skill intensive good. The offer curve o f  the South T, thus, must satisfy the 
balanced trade condition ( Y ^ C J / M  =  T ( p 2/ip i ), with imports M  and terms o f  
trade ( p 2l p i) being given by equation (II.9) and (11.10), respectively.
How does the Northern econom y react in response to that shock? In the new 
equilibrium it must absorb the Southern excess supply o f  the less skill intensive 
good. These imports depress the production o f  sector 2 whereas exports o f  the 
skill intensive good increase sector 1 output. The fixed relative wage (w/q)  implies 
that in each sector the number o f  employed unskilled workers per skilled worker, 
hh does not change. Consequently, the less skill intensive sector 2 lays off relatively 
more unskilled workers than the skill intensive sector 1 can profitably employ. The 
ensuing unemployment triggers a multiplier process. The reduced income lowers 
the demand for all three goods. This effect (which is caputered by the tem 
X ;A  ci +  w G®i ~  P2) in equations (A .9) in the Appendix) dampens the increase 
o f demand for unskilled labor in sector 1, further reduces employment o f  unskilled 
persons in sector 2, and even leads to lay offs in sector 3 (again, see equation 
(A.9)). The assumed flexibility o f  the wage-rental ratio (w/r)  ensures that the 
market o f  capital services clears along with the market o f  skilled labor. Since 
relative product prices depend on the relative wage rate (w/q)  and the wage-rental 
ratio (w/r) these prices adjust to the new cost structure (see equations (A .10) in 
the Appendix).
Formally, I derive the employment rate o f  unskilled workers, X. A f/ # ,  in the 
Appendix from equations (II.1), the profit maximizing conditions (II.2), the
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demand functions (II.5), the accounting identity (II.7) and the market clearing 
conditions for good 2 and 3, the capital and the skilled labor market, respectively:
(11.11) C2 =  m { p j p 2Y1 +  Y2 + p 3/p2Y3) +  Y2,
c3 = r3.
K = Z i K i,
After some tedious algebra the following formula emerges:
(11.12) H n , ) , .  ^ N‘ -  f c e a V L v ,  +  ” <■. -  « ,) '
N \LiaiciJ\LiPici + m(Pi-P2)J'
It determines the employment rate b o f  unskilled workes as a function o f  m. The 
share o f  good 2 in consumption, c2, binds the marginal propensity to import, m, 
from above to ensure that the home country is still producing good 2. Thus, 
nominator and denominator o f  the second term in brackets are positive, b is a 
decreasing function o f  m,  if  the following condition holds:
(11.13) (1 -  c3)(ci1P2 -  a2jSi) +  c3(a1/?3 -  a3P1 +  a j 2 -  a2]S3) <  0.
It is an assumption on the relative skill intensity o f  the three sectors. For instance, 
if  the three sectors can be ranked according to
hl (w/q) >  h3 (w/q) >  h2( w / q ) o —  >  —  >  —
«i a 3 a2
condition (11.13) is fullfilled.
The solid line in Figure II. 1 is a plot o f  this function. I adapted the values o f  
the parameters in equation (11.12) to German data. Since it proved rather difficult 
to combine data on employment, occupational qualification and sectoral con­
sumption shares to obtain reliable estimates o f  the m odel’s parameters, I picked 
values with an eye at the m odel’s chances to explain a rather large increase in 
unemployment. The value o f  c3 =  0.45 reflects the share o f  the German service 
sector (i.e. wholesale and retail trade, transportation, banking, insurance, and 
housing services) in private sector gross value added at the end o f  the nineteen 
eighties (cf. private sector gross value added at the end o f  the nineteen eighties 
(cf. Sachverstandigenrat 1994, Table 26*). Lacking better data, I split the remaining 
55 percent equally between c, and c2.
The German statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) classifies blue collar 
workers according to three skill groups and splits white collar workers into five 
ones. W hite collar jobs in group V require no finished formal occupational training
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Figure II. 1
(in terms o f  the German statistic “abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung”). That also 
holds true for blue collar jobs in groups II and III. Therefore, I consider workers 
in these groups as unskilled.6 In April 1993 their share in the total number o f  
West German employees covered by the wage statistic is 23.4 percent.7 This number 
is in accordance with a figure derived from another source. According to the 
employment survey o f  the Statistisches Bundesamt and Deutsche Bundesbank
(1996) about 22.9 percent o f  the West German workforce o f  1993 were without 
a finished formal occupational training. According to the wage statistic o f  April 
1993, the skilled to unskilled ratio in the manufacturing sector ranges from about 
17 (electricity) to 0.6 (rubber and mining). The respective wage shares in gross
6 The data on wages and employment are from Statistisches Bundesamt (1994a) Table 2, 
pp. 1 2 -8 5  and Table3, pp. 8 6 -1 5 9 , Statistisches Bundesamt (1994b), Table2, pp. 1 2 -3 3  
and Table 5, pp. 7 8 -9 9 , Statistisches Bundesamt (1994c), Table 3.4, p. 163. Wages were 
corrected upwards by the average share o f  em ployers’ contributions to social security in 
gross wage and salary income. These figures were taken from Sachverstandigenrat (1996), 
p. 360 and p. 366. Data on gross value added are from Statistisches Bundesamt (1996), 
pp. 145, 146, and 148.
7 The wage statistic provides no data on unskilled blue collar workers in the sectors wholesale 
and retail trade, insurance and banking. The overall share o f  unskilled workers is an 
estimate that assumes equal shares o f  unskilled blue and white collar workers in these 
sectors. The share o f  unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector is 31 percent. This 
figure is an upper bound o f  the estimate, since the share o f  unskilled white collar workers 
in the manufacturing sector is considerably larger than that in the service sectors for 
which data are available.
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value added are 0.39 (skilled) and 0.02 (unskilled) in the former and 0.28 and 
0.06, respectively, in the latter sector. Obviously, both sectors are highly capital 
intensive. In less capital intensive, yet also skill intensive sectors, like the production 
o f office equipment, the wage share o f  skilled (unskilled) workers is about 0.87 
(0.02). In the less skill intensive foundry industry skilled (unskilled) workers earn 
about 56 (32) percent o f  value added. The wage statistic provides no data on wage 
income in the service sector. Therefore, I used the com m only employed, economy- 
wide estimates a =  /i =  y =  1 /3 (cf. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992, p. 432). 
Together, I chose the following, slightly rounded figures: =  0.05, /?, =  0.75, 
a2 =  0.30, ft2 =  0.55, a3 =  fi3 =  0.33, which meet condition (11.13).
German imports from non industrialized countries amount to about 5 percent 
o f  G N P 8. This value o f  m implies that about 7 percent o f  the unskilled workforce 
is laid off. If unskilled labor is a less important factor o f  production in the service 
sector, i.e. if  a 3 =  0.25 and /(3 =  0.50, the share o f  unemployed unskilled persons 
increases to 7.5 percent. This example illustrates that the results are not too 
sensitive to the chosen values o f  the m odel’s parameters. The dashed line in Figure
II.1 gives the share o f  employed unskilled workers emerging from the Krugman 
(1995) two-factors-two-goods model. Since his estimates o f  =  /?2 =  1/3 and 
a 2 =  Pi  =  2/3 are less extreme, his model predicts at m =  0.05 that about 93.4 
percent o f  the unskilled workforce remain employed. Using my values o f  the factor 
shares but leaving Krugman’s value o f  c, =  5/7 unchanged, his model predicts a 
much larger fall in employment o f  roughly 11.5 percent. This big difference 
demonstrates the importance o f  non-tradeable goods. Their omission in the 
Krugman model accounts for the wedge between the solid and the dotted line in 
Figure II. 1.
Under the less extreme conditions o f  the three sector model the international 
trade argument explains only a small part o f  the German employment problem. 
Between 1977 and 1995 the number o f  West German employees without finished 
formal occupational training decreased by 27.7 percent.9 The seven percent 
predicted by the three sector model are only one quarter o f  this number. In 1977 
about one third o f  the West German work force were unskilled. Thus, about 2.3 
percentage points o f  the West German overall unemployment rate o f  currently 
more than 9 percent may be due to trade with less developed countries. What, 
then, may explain the huge increase in German unemployment? The model 
presented in the next section hints at another answer to that question.
8 This figure is based on data from Statistisches Bundesamt (1994d), Table 12.11.1.
9 These data were taken from Statistisches Bundesamt and Deutsche Bundesbank (1996); 
the share o f  unskilled workers is defined as sum o f  the number o f  employees given in 
series #2198108  and #2198216  in percent o f  all employees (listed in series #2198036).
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3. Wage gaps and capital accumulation
I shall tackle the long run consequences o f  rigid wages within a framework that 
has proven quite successful in explaining cross country differences in per capita 
income, namely the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) extension o f  the Solow  
(1956) growth model.
There are three factors o f  production, effective labor, AN,  human capital, H,  
and physical capital, K. They produce output, Y, according to a constant returns 
to scale Cobb-Douglas technology:
(III.l) Y — ( A N y H ^ K y, a +  /? +  y =  1.
The level o f  labor augmenting technical progress, A,  increases exogenously at rate 
a. Labor supply, N,  grows at rate n. Households supply factor services independent 
o f wages and rental rates. They invest the fraction sH o f  their gross income in 
human capital, which depreciates at rate dH. Similarly, sK is the fraction o f  gross 
income Y invested in physical capital depreciating at rate SK. This econom y evolves 
according to
where k  and h denote physical and human capital per effective worker, respectively. 
It is straightforward to show that the econom y approaches a balanced growth 
path were k  and h are fixed at
respectively (cf. MauBner and Klump, 1996, p. 69). The labor market continuously 
clears, since the marginal product o f  labor equals the real wage rate w. At the 
steady state this requires
(III.4) w* =  A a ( h * f ( k * y .
To illustrate the working o f  this model with an exogenously given real wage rate, 
consider the following experiment. Assume the wage were set according to
(III.2) k =  sKh^ky — (a +  n +  ôK) k,
h =  sHhl>k y -  (a +  n +  ôH) h, h
a +  n +  ôH
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where x  x 100 measures the size o f  the wage gap in percent o f  the steady state 
market clearing rate. Thus, the wage increases still at the same rate, yet a higher 
level. As an immediate consequence, firms dismiss workers and output shrinks 
relative to its equilibrium path. Households accumulate less capital than they 
otherwise would have done. Therefore, assuming that w is unchanged, the gap 
between the marginal product o f  labor and the real wage widens in the next period, 
and unemployment increases further. If w is fixed for a long period o f  time, the 
econom y settles at a new steady state where capital per effective employee is 
constant. Given the exogenous growth o f  the work force, the rate o f  employment, 
b ■■= LjN,  decreases at a constant rate. I prove this proposition in the Appendix. 
In the special case o f  identical rates o f depreciation, d =  SK =  dH, there is a simple 
analytical solution:
(III.6) j  = (f l  +  n +  5)[(l +  x ) - T ^ 5 - l ] ,  
b
Thus, if  the wage gap were to persist indefinitely, unemployment would increase 
steadily. To get a feeling for the involved magnitudes consider the following: 
Between 1960 and 1990 West German output per worker grew at an average 
exponential rate o f  a =  0.028, and the West German work force increased at rate 
n =  0.004. The average ratio between capital consumption and the net capital 
stock in the same period is 5 =  0 .046.10 a =  1/3 is an estimate o f  the wage share 
in growth models with human capital emerging from the cross country study o f  
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) p. 432. Given these numbers, each percentage 
point o f  the wage rate w above its steady state level decreases the growth rate o f  
employment by approximately 0.04 percentage points. Within ten years, then, the 
rate o f  employment decreases by 0.4 percentage points.
I illustrate this dynamic effect in Figure III.l using the values o f a, n, and <5 
from above.11 Starting at time t =  10 the real wage leaves its balanced growth 
path. Within five years it climbs to a level that is five percent above the steady 
state path. The wage stays there for a period o f  25 years and returns to its former 
value within the next five years. After five more years the wage adjusts to the 
market clearing level. The dotted line in Figure III.l displays the wage path. The 
solid line marks the according time path o f  unemployment, u ■■= 1 — b. The rising 
wage pushes unemployment to 7.5 percent o f  the work force. Then, the dynamic 
effect sets in and raises w to 11.5 percent. When the wage returns to its former 
path, it cannot compensate this additional unemployment. Due to a shortage o f  
both physical and human capital, the marginal product o f  labor is smaller than 
that along the undisturbed growth path. Thus, while from now on labor supply
10 The data underlying these figures were taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (1994e), Table
3.6.4 and Sachverstândigenrat (1994), pp. 339, 351, and 355.
11 A close inspection o f  the equations o f  m otion reveals that the time path o f b is independent 
o f  the savings rates if  ôK =  SH.
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Figure III.l
and demand increase at the same rate, unemployment remains above five percent. 
Wages must drop substantially below their long run growth path to recover full 
employment. They return to that path only gradually during an extended period 
o f time.
I do not suppose that wage gaps arise endogenously. Yet, as in the Section 2, 
there are shocks that require wages to deviate temporarily from the balanced 
growth path. The German unification is a very prominent example. To consider 
it within the present m odel assume that the West German econom y was on its 
balanced growth path before 1990, and that the West German production  
technology became immediately available to the East German economy. It is 
generally acknowledged that East German workers are well trained. Thus, we 
may neglect noticeable differences in embodied human capital between the West 
and East German workforce. The partical restructuring o f  East German univer­
sities and the foundation o f  research institutes, on the other hand, hint at differences 
in non-embodied human capital. Nevertheless, let me suppose that human capital 
per effective worker was the same in both parts o f  Germany. There was, however, 
a sizeable difference in physical capital. In the western part the real value of 
physical capital per member o f  the work force totaled at 198 thousand Deutsch­
mark12. An estimate for the eastern part is 63.5 thousand (1989) Deutschm ark.13
12 Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt (1994e), Table 3.64, Sachverstandigenrat (1994), Table21*, 
p. 339.
13 I took the capital stock figure from Sinn (1992), p. 88, who calculates the wage decrease 
within a static framework, and the number o f  the East German workforce from Institut 
der Deutschen Wirtschaft (1997), Table 13.
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The much smaller East German capital stock amounts to a higher real interest 
rate in East Germany shortly after the fall o f  the Berlin wall. The interest rate 
differential triggered capital flows to the eastern part. In the frictionless environ­
ment o f  the model these flows equalize the stock o f  physical capital per worker 
in both parts o f  Germany. Given the much smaller size o f  the East German work 
force, West German capital per worker must fall by 15.6 percent. If physical 
capital’s elasticity o f  production is y =  1/3, West German wages had to decrease 
by 5.2 percent to maintain full em ploym ent.14
Figure 111.2
Figure III.2 displays the time path o f  the rate o f  unemployment predicted by 
the model, if  the wage rate does not adjust to the capital loss occurring at time 
t =  5. There is an upsurge in unemployment due to the sudden gap opening 
between labor productivity and the real wage. Alm ost 6.5 percent o f  the work 
force are immediately laid off.15 Afterwards, capital per effective worker slowly
14 Full employment requires the real wage rate w to equal the marginal product o f  labor. 
This condition reads:
w =  a A (hf k y).
It implies that the elasticity o f  w with respect to k is y.
15 The elasticity o f  labor demand L  with respect to physical capital K  in the face o f rigid 
wages is y /(l — a). To get this result write the labor market clearing condition as 
w/A =  a ( A L ) * ~ ' H 11 K '  and differentiate with respect to L  and K  holding w and A 
fixed.
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approaches its unchanged steady state value. Thereby labor productivity increases 
relative to the real wage. The wedge between the current wage, w =  Aw,  and the 
wage securing immediate full employment, wf -= K y, shrinks. The
dotted line in Figure III.2 refers to the time path o f  this wedge, labeled current 
wage gap and measured on the right scale. Capital accumulation, however, has 
little effect on the rate o f  unemployment, which does not fall below six percent.
A shock with similar consequences is the rapid increase o f  the West German 
labor force. Between 1960 and 1977 there was an almost negligible upward sloping 
trend o f  potential labor supply. Yet, the period between 1977 and 1990 witnessed 
a fivefold increase o f  the average exponential growth rate o f  the labor force from  
0.153 to 0.794 percent. During that period over 3.3 million additional people 
entered the labor market.16 Wages had to depart from their former growth path 
to induce an according growth o f  jobs. Consider, then, what happens, if wages 
do not adjust. To apply equation (III.6), we need to know the size o f the 
hypothetical wage gap. I assume that except n none o f  the m odel’s parameters 
changed between the two periods. In addition to a =  1/3, a =  0.028 and 6 =  0.046 
the savings rates must be chosen. The average share o f  gross investment in West 
German G N P between 1960 and 1990 is 23.46 percent. The sum o f private R& D  
expenditures and public expenditures on science promotion, education and 
schooling is between 8.2 and 8.4 percent o f  G N P in the first half o f  the nineties.17 
I used the slightly rounded values sK =  0.235 and sH =  0.085. Given these numbers, 
equation (III.3) to (III.5) imply a wage gap o f  more than 17.5 percent. Figure
III.3 illustrates the time path o f  unemployment. The shock occurs at year t =  5. 
The labor force grows at the new rate for 14 years. Then, n drops to its former 
value. Governed by equation (III.6) unemployment steadily grows to over 8.5 
percent and remains at that level after year t =  19. The dotted line in Figure III.3 
marks the current wage gap as defined in the previous paragraph.
There is an important qualification o f  these considerations. Capital imports 
from abroad mitigate the impact o f  sudden capital losses on unemployment. 
Consider, e.g., the framework o f  Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
There, the small home economy can borrow unconstrained amounts o f  physical 
capital on the world market. Immediate capital imports compensate a sudden loss 
o f home capital that disturbs a balanced growth path. Thus, there is no need for 
wage adjustments. However, the increased foreign debt lowers future consumption. 
Thus, agents trade current wage reductions against smaller rates o f  consumption  
in the future.
16 Lestimated the growth rates o f  the labor force from the data supplied in Sachverstän­
digenrat (1994), Table 21*.
17 I took the data on private R & D  expenditures and public expenditures on science 
prom otion and education from various issues o f  Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, 
Zahlen zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Interestingly,
8.4 percent is the estimated ratio o f  the West German workforce enrolled in secondary 
school employed in the paper o f M ankiw, Römer, and Weil (1992) as proxy o f  sH.
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Time in years 
Figure III.3
Under less extreme assumptions on capital imports exogenous shocks together 
with wage rigidities in the long run may well explain unemployment o f  the size 
actually observed in the recent German econom ic history.
4. Conclusion
Econom ists tend to blame non market clearing wages for unemployment. 
I argue that it is impossible to assess the empirical content o f  this statement by 
comparing observed wages to various measures o f  full employment wage rates. 
The notion o f market clearing wages is specific to the applied model. And since 
it is impossible to identify the true structure o f  the economy it is also impossible 
to estimate the size o f  wage gaps.
I propose an alternative approach that is well known from recent business cycle 
research. The method is to confront the results o f  computable models with the 
facts o f  the labor market.
I consider two types o f  models. A  static model o f  international trade where the 
wage structure is kept at its autarkic, full employment level explains about one 
quarter o f  current West German unemployment. Quantitatively more important 
are the consequences o f  prolonged wage gaps. In a standard growth model with 
fixed real wages the capital shortage that occurred in the wake o f  the German 
unification implies unemployment over six percent o f  the work force. Similarly, 
non adjustment o f  wages to the rapid growth o f  the labor force between 1977 
and 1990 accounts for unemployment rates up to 8.5 percent.
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I used simple textbook models far apart from the complexity o f  huge econometric 
models often employed in this context. Yet, it is this simplicity that helps to 
understand and to assess the empirical relevance o f  various mechanisms by which 
non market clearing wages may induce unemployment.
Zusammenfassung
Die deutsche Arbeitslosigkeit wird gemeinhin auf überhöhte Reallöhne zurück­
geführt. Ich vergleiche die quantitativen Implikationen dieser Hypothese im 
Rahmen eines M odells mit Nord-Süd-Handel mit denen im Rahmen eines 
Wachstumsmodells. Das erstgenannte M odell vermag 2,3 Prozentpunkte der 
westdeutschen Arbeitslosenquote zu erklären. Wesentlich bedeutsamer sind die 
langfristigen Folgen überhöhter Reallöhne im Rahmen des Wachstumsmodells. 
Die Kapitalverknappung im Zuge der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und der rasche 
Anstieg der Erwerbspersonen zwischen 1977 und 1990 könnten die Arbeitslosigkeit 
kräftig erhöht haben.
Appendix
In this Appendix I derive the key equations o f  the trade model o f  Section 2 
and the growth model o f  Section 3.
The Trade Model:  In next few steps I derive the solution o f  the trade model 
given the marginal propensity to import, m >  0. m =  0 corresponds to the autarkic 
solution.
The market clearing condition for good 2 reads:
C2 =  M + Y 2 =  m ( i p j p 2) Y1 +  Y2 +  ( p 3l p 2) Y3) +  Y2.
The budget identity (II.7) and the demand functions (II.5) imply:
C2 =  c2( (p1/ p 2) Y 1 +  Y2 +  ( p 3/ p 2) Y 3).
Eliminate C2 from these two equations to get:
(A .l)  y t (c2 - m )  =  ( p 2/ p 1)(  1 +  m - c 2) Y 2 +  ( p 3/ p 1)(m -  c2) r 3.
Since Yt =  H{hf‘ ~ l k'{‘ (from the production functions (II. 1)) and 
(A.2) p J p ^ i U J M h l ' - ' k l ' h i - ^ k ^ i ,
(from the second row o f equations (II.2)) equation (A .l)  implies:
,  M i +  g ,
P2 {c2 - m )  P3
Apply the same procedure to the market clearing condition for good 3,
C3 = c3 ( ^ Y 1 + ^ Y 3+ Y 3) = Y 3,
\Pi Pi )
=>(1 -  c 3) —  Y3 = c3Y1 + c3 —  Y2 
P i P i
to get:
(A. 4) h 3 =  - ^ — H 1 +  — ^ — H 2.
^(l-Cs) P2 ( l  - c 3) 2
Equation (A .3), (A.4) and the market clearing condition, H  =  determine
the allocation o f  skilled labor:
( A «  rj P i (m  + Cl)(A. d) n l — _  H,
l iiPi ci +  m ( P l - p 2) 
P2 (c2 - m )
2 T i P i ci +  m ( P i - P i )
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Pi C3
Z i P i ci +  m (Pi - P i Y
H 3 =  ^ ------ —  H.
Since
h ,  k j  P i  y ,
=  ?  f o r ^ '  =  1’ 2 ’ 3 hj ki Pj yt 
(from (II.2)) the solution o f
H± =  P1 y1 K1  
H 2 p 2 y , K 2
h 3 P 3 y , K 3 
K  =  K l +  K 2 +  K 3
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provides the allocation o f  capital:
( A . 6 )  r , ( r , + " 0
ci +  m ( y 1 - y 2)
y2 (c 2 -  m)
L r  ici +  m ( y i - y 2)
?3c3
Ci +  m ( - y 2)
K 3 =  ^ --------- ^ ----------- t K.
Analogously, under autarky (m =  0) the solution to
H , B, oc, N.
J T  =  T  W ’H 2 a i 2
# i  = / [ i « 3 * 1
^3  ^ 3 « i A^ 3’
AT =  +  AT2 +  N 3 
provides the distribution o f  unskilled labor between the sectors:
(A .8) N, =  ^ - N ,  i =  1 , 2 , 3 .
The autarkic relative wage, equation (11,11), follows from (w/q )* =  (aj //?,) 
( H J N j ,  (A .8), and (A.5).
The system o f equations (A.7) is replaced by H t =  (Pi/ a i) (w /q)*Ni in the case 
o f north-south trade under fixed relative wages. U sing these relations together 
with equations (A.5) and the solution for (w/q)*  from equation (II.8) one can 
derive the allocation o f  unskilled labor:
(A.9) N 1 =
N 2 =
Z P i C i ~ \ a 1 ( m  +  C j )  “ I
L a i c i - _ Z i P i c i +  m ( P i - P 2 ) J
L P i c i a 2 ( c 2 - m )  1
. L a i c i_ _ H i P i c i +  m ( P i  — P 2 ) ]
a 3 C3
_ L A c  t +  m i P i - P i ) .
N.
These equations, in turn, imply equation (11.12) in Section II. From
El =
Pi a2 h i1k l 1’
Pi  =  “ i h ^ k V  
Pi
and (A. 5) through (A.9) the impact o f  imports upon relative prices can be 
determined (where an asterix marks relative prices under autarky):
(A. 10) — =  ( — \*A (m)y 
Pi \P iJ
P l  =  ( P l \ A{m)n - n  
Pi \P iJ
^ y‘ci 'LiPici +  m (P 1 - ^ 2)
H i P A  'LiyiCi +  m ( y l - y 2) '
Finally, using the skill intensive good als numeraire, =  1, and defining the price 
index
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the purchasing power o f  unskilled labor income, relative to autarky, is given by
wlp  v
(A .11) - f -  =  A ( m ) ^ .
( w / p )*
Hence, the real wage o f  unskilled labores decreases with m,  iff workers A’ (m) <  0. 
Using otj +  jij -I- '/i =  1 this requires
(A .12) Pi P2 0  C3)(a l^2 a2^l) C3(®1^3 *3^1 a3^2 V-2fiz) <'
which is slightly stronger than condition (11.13).
The Growth Model:  Let L  denote the number o f  employed workers and consider 
the production function
Y  =  (AL)‘H f K \  <x +  p  +  y =  i .
Profit maximization with respect to labor input requires
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(A. 13) w =  (w /A ) =  a i A L f - ' H V K - 1,
where w is the real wage and w the real wage per efficiency unit o f  labor. Thus, 
holding h> fixed, labor demand L  must grow at rate
L 8 H  y K
(A. 14) / : = -  =  — ------ +  — ----------- a,
’ L  1 - o c  H  1 - a  K
and capital accumulates according to
(A. 15) ^  =  sK{ A L y H fK ^ 1 - S K,
~f[ =  sn (AL y i fP  ~ 1 K v — SH.
Eliminating the growth rates o f  physical and human capital along with (A L ) from 
equation (A .14) gives / as a function o f  z== K j H :
(A. 16) / = r ^ U  j  +  ~ T ^ « a
Now, define k  and h as physical and human capital per effective, employed unit 
of labor, k — K j A L  and h — H /A L ,  respectively. Differentiate these definitions 
with respect to time and substitute from equations (A. 15) and (A. 14). This yields
(A.17) = +
k  1 — a \ w j  1 — a ’
h y /oAi-Ërj __ y y . p _ i  y(ôr — S„)
\Sfjh i -«  k  1 -a  — sKh 1 -a  k  i - * ] + -
Since
z  k  h 
z k h ’
the evolution o f  z is governed by
(A. 18) -  =  ( “ V  *\sKz  i - * - s Hz i - * ] + ô g - ô K.
Z  \ w j
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The steady state value o f  z, z*,  solves
r y ( w \  i g
(A. 19) 5k (z*)_t ^  -  sH(z*)— * =  f - J  x(5k -  dH).
The left hand side o f  this equation is a monotonically decreasing function o f  
z* e  (0, o o ) with range ( — o o ,  +  o o ) .  Thus, given any w >  0, there exits a unique 
z*(w)  solving equation (A .19). Figure A .l illustrates this result. In the special case
o f equal rates o f  depreciation, d =  SK =  SH, this solution is given by 
(A .20) z* =  — .
SH
It is also obvious from Figure A .l that z >  0 ( <  0) to the left (right) o f  z*. Hence, 
the rest point is globally stable in (0, o o ) .  z and I approach stationary values that 
are uniquely determined by the size o f  the wage gap x. If both types o f capital 
depreciate at the same rate S, equation (A .20) and (A. 16) imply that the rate o f  
employment b ■■= L / N  grows at rate
b  a
(A.21) -  =  l (x) — n =  (a +  n +  <5)[(1 +  x) i - «  —1], 
b
which is equation (III.6) given in Section 3.
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